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Cognition in Emotional Disorders:  An Abundance of Habit and a Dearth of Control 
Paula Hertel 
  
Emotional and other psychological disorders are categories of experience identified at 
least in part by the goal of having treatment plans for people in distress. Because the categories 
exist for such purposes, research efforts are organized to discover distinctions among the 
categories and between disordered and nondisordered individuals. Many of these distinctions are 
cognitive.  When clinical scientists began experimental studies, the term “cognitive” had been 
used to refer primarily to conscious thoughts that characterize disorders (see Beck, 1976), but in 
more recent decades the term signifies an experimental approach framed according to the 
theories and paradigms of cognitive psychology. In honor of Larry Jacoby’s contributions to 
cognitive psychology, this essay first describes experimental evidence regarding the cognitive 
habits of anxious and depressed individuals—habits that are quite similar across the disorders. 
Attention, interpretation, and memory tasks reveal negative biases that reflect well practiced 
tendencies.  Next, the essay briefly reviews the results of recent efforts to modify negative 
biases. I argue that attempts to overcome habits via controlled procedures or by external 
constraints seem to be less successful than attempts to develop new habits.  In depression, at 
least, habits are accompanied by difficulties in mustering opposition to them. Ultimately, the 
next important step in understanding cognitive contributions to emotional disorders is to take a 
more process-analytic approach. Toward the end of the essay I show how process-dissociation 
procedures (Jacoby, 1991) can be used to investigate the basis for clinically relevant change. 
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Cognitive Habits in Emotional Disorders 
 The term “habit” is least presumptively used to refer to a pattern of behavior that can be 
repeatedly and differentially observed in the behavior of those who are able to emit it. Some 
people show the pattern and others do not. We might identify a habit of going for an early-
morning walk, for example, but not a habit of walking. Cognitive habits in anxiety and 
depression might be experienced on an individual level as habits of thinking specific, identifiable 
thoughts, such as the contents of rumination about a recent failure, but I use the term habit more 
abstractly to refer to tendencies to attend, interpret, and remember in ways that are qualitatively 
biased by the nature of the emotional disorder (see Hertel, 2004). Such habits, like the early-
morning walk, are implicitly viewed as being initiated nondeliberately. One just dresses and 
heads out the door, although one is capable of doing otherwise. Similarly, someone who is 
socially anxious is inclined to interpret social ambiguity in a negative and personal way, 
although she can see the alternative interpretation when asked to consider it. The extent to which 
cognitive habits are automatic in the sense of being difficult to interrupt has been a topic of 
theoretical concern (see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). However, to the extent that habits arise 
from practice, through different experiences they should be subject to interruption and change 
(see Bouton, 2000). 
Biases in Attention and Interpretation  
In the literature on cognition in emotional disorders, evidence of biased attention is 
revealed by the anxiety-specific capture of attention by threatening events—words, faces, 
pictures, actual spiders and snakes—and the subsequent delay in disengaging attention from 
those events (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; 
Rinck & Becker, 2006). In a different cognitive domain, ambiguity is more often lost on the 
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anxious individual, who typically takes the negative view (e.g., Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, 
& Mathews, 1991).  Negative interpretation biases are revealed when, for example, socially 
phobic individuals see an acquaintance’s frown as an expression of displeasure instead of 
effortful thought or puzzlement, or when the ambiguity inherent in hypothetical situations is 
resolved in socially phobic directions (e.g., Stopa & Clark, 2000). Because alternative 
interpretations fail to come to mind spontaneously, such resolutions are treated as habitual when 
they are discussed in clinical contexts (Brozovich & Heimberg, 2008).  
 Biases in attention and interpretation are implicitly viewed as automatic partly because 
they are seen as emerging from cognitive mechanisms not readily available to introspection 
(MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). This point of view was expressed early on in clinically-oriented 
cognitive research through the emotional Stroop paradigm (see the review by Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). In the traditional Stroop task, word reading is considered to be 
automatic due to practice; the reading habit slows color naming of color words when the word 
and its color are incongruent, and the difficulty in overriding this habit is an example of deficient 
cognitive control. Similarly, in the emotional variant of the task, slowed responses in naming the 
color of emotionally negative words is an expression of a habit to attend to meaning emerging in 
spite of its irrelevance and one’s intention. Greater interference from spider words by spider 
phobics illustrates this sort of attentional bias. By reasoning that performance on any task rarely 
reveals the operation of a unitary process, Lindsay and Jacoby (1994) showed that different task 
manipulations independently affected estimates of word reading (the habitual process) and color 
naming (the controlled process). So too it might be true of emotionally disordered biases on the 
Stroop task, as well as on other tasks designed to measure interpretation biases. For example, we 
might examine habitual and controlled components of the interpretation of ambiguity in social 
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situations. Process-analytic investigations would be useful in acquiring knowledge in these 
domains. 
 There is also evidence of emotional Stroop effects in depression (e.g., Gotlib & McCann, 
1984), perhaps because depressed participants are often anxious. In keeping with our common 
sense that anxious people are vigilant, anxiety seems more clearly associated with attentional 
biases. Other cognitive paradigms for investigating biases that seem “vigilant” have also 
revealed anxiety-related biases more clearly than depression-related biases (see Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005). An early influential framework developed by Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and 
Mathews (1997) distinguished between anxiety-related attention and interpretation biases and 
depression-related biases involving more controlled procedures, such as elaboration, mainly 
because the most frequently observed cognitive bias in depression had emerged on tests of 
deliberate recall. This distinction between anxiety and depression, however, might not be best 
conceived as a distinction between biases in automatic and controlled processes, but instead as a 
reflection of the type of cognitive pattern that characterizes the phenomenology of the disorder. 
The nature of the pattern most frequently found in depression is rumination—a habit of 
repetitively attending to past events that are emotionally related to one’s personal concerns (see 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). This pattern is likely to be more compatible 
with procedures invoked by recall and other tasks with a backward focus than with tasks 
sensitive to vigilance. In keeping with this analysis, rumination-related biases in maintaining 
attention to a variety of previously presented negative stimuli have been documented in recent 
years (see the reviews by Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012; Whitmer & Gotlib, 
2012). For example, rumination is associated with difficulty in ignoring emotionally negative 
words that were recently attended but are no longer relevant (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) and in 
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refreshing attention to neutral words previously encountered in the context of negative words 
(Bernblum & Mor, 2010). 
Rumination is similar to worry, the self-reported repetitive thinking associated with 
anxiety. The difference between the two is whether attention is focused on the past (in 
rumination, e.g., Why did she leave me?) or on the present and future (Where is the spider now? 
How will I ever get a job?). In both cases, the thought is typically initiated in the absence of 
attention-demanding external stimuli. When the external world is uneventful, subsets of both 
depressed and anxious people tend to engage in repetitive thinking and often not in a deliberate, 
controlled fashion. Instead, like intrusive memories, the repetitive thoughts crowd consciousness 
without being sought and sometimes in spite of efforts to think otherwise. Thus, in a pattern 
similar to experimentally examined biases, the self-reported experiences of rumination and worry 
seem to qualify as cognitive habits (Hay & Jacoby, 1996), each time initiated no more 
intentionally than the capture of attention by a negative face.   
Deficient Cognitive Control 
The notion of a cognitive habit aligns, although imperfectly, with automaticity in 
cognitive operations (see Moors & de Houwer, 2006). At the other end of the automaticity 
continuum, cognitive control sits in opposition to habit, and it does so in the very real sense that 
control seems to be the way out of a maladaptive habit. A consideration of control-related 
aspects of cognition in emotional disorders is therefore important.  
Although anxious individuals are typically not impaired on tasks requiring control, the 
act of worrying itself is a challenge to control especially for those who habitually worry (e.g., 
Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008).  In the experiment by Hayes et al., high and low worriers 
performed a primary task of thinking about a current worry topic or a positive topic while also 
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periodically pressing a “random” key on a keypad.  (This is a version of the dual task method 
developed by Baddeley, 1966, to measure residual working memory capacity.) The high worriers 
who thought about the worry topic were less random in their patterns of key presses than the 
other three conditions, with the latter producing similar patterns.  So even though worry is 
habitual in its manner of initiation, the engaged habit demands attention and probably enjoys 
precedence over other controlled procedures when temptations to worry are great. 
Depression is frequently associated with impaired performance on tasks invoking 
controlled procedures (see Hertel, 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010).  We know that cognitive 
control is implicated, partly on the basis of corroborating neural evidence (e.g., Disner, Beevers, 
Haight, & Beck, 2011; Hamilton et al., 2011; Vanderhasselt et al., 2012) but also because 
difficult tasks can be accomplished just as well by depressed people if attention is guided and 
constrained to the task at hand. In fact, depression-related differences can disappear if 
opportunities for rumination are avoided. Perhaps the first clear evidence of these claims was 
obtained in a memory experiment in which I varied the task performed during a 7-min interval 
between study and test (Hertel, 1998). Dysphoric students (who self-report depression but are 
likely also anxious) performed a rumination-induction task or a distraction task, or they simply 
waited with nothing to do but think.  The subsequent fragment-completion test used process-
dissociation procedures (Jacoby, 1991) to estimate automatic and controlled components of 
memory for the studied words. No effects on the automatic component were found. Instead, with 
estimates of controlled recollection as the measure, dysphoric students who waited during the 
interval performed similarly to those encouraged to ruminate and less well than the nondysphoric 
controls in both conditions (see Figure 1). This outcome encourages the conclusion that 
“uninstructed” rumination occurs during unfilled periods and carries forward to disrupt 
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subsequent cognitive control. In this way, rumination is not merely a method of dividing 
attention while performing a simultaneous task; the potential consequences are ongoing. 
Moreover, the results of this experiment also support the hypothesis that controlled procedures 
are not necessarily impaired in depressed states, because no deficit was found in the distraction 
condition.  
My colleagues and I have also found rumination-related deficits in the free recall of 
verbal material when attention during their initial exposure was not well constrained by the task; 
we eliminated the deficit in a condition that provided such constraint by requiring a response at 
the end of each learning trial (Hertel, Benbow, & Geraerts, 2012). Interference with controlled 
procedures also emerges in experiments on suppression-induced forgetting (e.g., Hertel & 
Gerstle, 2003). After learning emotionally valenced cue-target pairs by forming self-relevant 
images, students practiced cued recall of some targets and cued suppression of others; still other 
cues were reserved to serve as baseline on a final cued-recall test in which participants were 
encouraged to recall all targets to all cues, regardless of previous practice.  Self-identified 
ruminators produced a smaller suppression effect on recall, regardless of their depression scores.  
Suppression practice in this paradigm (think/no-think; Anderson & Green, 2001) demands self-
control of attention via the brute-force technique of staring at the cue while not allowing the 
target to come to mind. Subsequent experiments (e.g., Joormann, Hertel, LeMoult, & Gotlib, 
2009) found that depression-related deficits in forgetting materials with negative meaning could 
be reduced or eliminated by the provision of thought substitutes to aid suppression. Thus, 
experimentally provided strategies or task constraints can be used successfully to overpower the 
habit of rumination and thereby benefit performance on tasks that typically rely on cognitive 
control.  
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Recall tasks are also affected qualitatively by cognitive habits in emotional disorders.  
Although negatively biased recall is rarely found in anxiety, it can emerge when the 
interpretation of ambiguity is taken into account.  In an experiment performed with individuals 
diagnosed with Generalized Social Phobia (GSP) and nondisordered volunteers from the 
community, my colleagues and I showed that the recall of socially ambiguous scenarios 
contained intrusions that were consistent with the manner in which the scenarios had initially 
been interpreted (as revealed by their continuation sentences; Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, & 
Gotlib, 2008). Intrusions were not more numerous in the GSP group; they were simply more 
socially anxious in meaning, and that outcome was likely a direct result of the well-documented 
habit for individual with social anxiety to spontaneously create distorted mental images (see 
Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006). In a subsequent experiment we presented the same scenarios 
together with continuations produced by the GSP participants in the previous experiment to 
nonanxious students who were instructed either to form an image of each scenario and its 
continuation or to judge the extent to which the continuations provided closure. Later the 
students recalled the scenarios separately from the continuations. Even these nonanxious students 
produced socially anxious intrusions in scenario recall, but only in the imagery condition. In 
short, the event as interpreted is the event remembered. Therefore, any controlled attempt to 
recall the actual scenario (and combat the habit) will not succeed if ambiguity is resolved during 
initial encounters and source information is lost through imagining the event combined with its 
interpretation. The finding of memory bias in anxiety is atypical in the lab, but interpretation-
biased intrusions are probably common in the experience of the socially anxious person. Our 
demonstration once again illustrates the importance of considering the match between the type of 
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bias and the type of phenomenological habit, instead of sorting biases according to the degree of 
automaticity or control involved in the task.  
Changing Cognitive Habits in Emotional Disorders 
  Cognitive biases of the sort described thus far can be considered bad habits, because they 
have undesirable consequences. Remembering (wrongly) that someone has insulted you, for 
example, causes you to interact with that person in ways that do not promote good will. In fact, 
attention and interpretation biases contribute causally to the development and maintenance of 
emotional disorders (see Hertel & Mathews, 2011). Some clinical psychologists therefore seek to 
change biases through the practice of cognitive-behavioral therapy. The directive of telling 
someone not to engage the habit (e.g., quit biting your fingernails; don’t think negative thoughts) 
typically does not work, particularly when cognitive control is impaired. Moreover, efforts to 
train control generally have not been successful beyond the narrow limits of the training task (see 
Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012). Another option, illustrated above, is to construct external 
supports for circumventing the effects of such habits on ongoing and subsequent tasks that 
typically require control. Although experimental demonstrations of the benefits of thought 
substitutes and task constraints are useful in understanding the phenomena, they are rarely 
practical from a therapeutic point of view. In a way, they are like wearing gloves to prevent 
fingernail biting—successful but awkward to institute.  A final alternative is to consider that bad 
habits are modifiable by the same means that developed them in the first place: practice. If habits 
are conditioned by experience they can become counterconditioned by new experience, albeit 
with limited degrees of generalization (Bouton, 2000).  
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Cognitive Bias Modification    
The impetus for research on cognitive bias modification (CBM) was the chance that 
modification would reveal the causal connection between cognitive biases and the development 
or maintenance of the emotional disorder in question (see reviews by Hertel & Mathews, 2011; 
MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). In the manner of the methodological tradition practiced in the 
Jacoby lab, CBM experiments are designed to understand the cognitive components by “pushing 
around” potential causes. A variety of training tasks provide repetitive experience to constrain 
attention or interpretation in either a negative or benign direction and produce training-congruent 
outcomes on near-transfer tasks—very similar subsequent tasks in which responding (attending 
or interpreting) is not constrained.  If participants are trained to focus on the more negative of 
two simultaneously presented words, for example, by responding to a dot probe that consistently 
replaces the negative alternative, the transfer task might also present such words followed by 
probes replacing each type equally often. Shorter probe-response latencies during the transfer 
task typically are training-congruent. Some experiments have shown transfer effects days or even 
months following training. Therefore, new habits of attending and interpreting ambiguity can be 
achieved, and some of these have memorial consequences. For example, Tran, Hertel, and 
Joormann (2011) performed a CBM version of the memory-intrusion experiment described 
previously in this essay (Hertel et al., 2008). During training, participants were led to complete 
ambiguous scenarios in either consistently benign or negative directions. The transfer scenarios 
remained ambiguous, and participants invented endings for them. Subsequently, we observed 
training-congruent intrusions when we asked them to recall the transfer scenarios. 
 Typical CBM experiments vary the emotional valence of training, but other CBM 
procedures have targeted the nature of processing.  Holmes, Lang, and Shah (2009) trained 
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positive resolutions of ambiguous situations via mental-imagery or verbal-comprehension 
instructions and ratings. Imagery produced better transfer. Watkins, Baeyens, and Read (2009) 
trained dysphoric participants to make concrete instead of typically abstract construals of 
potentially negative events by focusing on specific, distinctive aspects. They subsequently 
showed a reduction in negative interpretations, compared to control groups.  These two sets of 
experiments, moreover, produced training-congruent effects on far-transfer tasks designed to 
reveal negative emotional reactions (also see Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). 
The imagery participants in the experiments by Holmes et al. were less affected by a later 
procedure for inducing negative mood; Watkins et al.’s participants with concrete training 
experienced reduced depressive symptoms a week later. Understanding the conditions for 
establishing far transfer is crucial to linking cognitive biases with emotional disorders. Even so, 
knowing more about the processes responsible for near transfer is also high on the agenda. In 
short, it is not enough to show that you can produce either type of transfer; understanding the 
component processes is central to a cognitive account of emotional disorders.  
Cognitive Habit Modification? 
The study of transfer has a long history in experimental psychology (see Ellis, 1965)—a 
history possibly useful in understanding the issues important to CBM. A conditioning 
perspective on CBM, for example, might invoke an examination of the conditions that affect 
generalization and discrimination in transfer. To the memory researcher, performance on near-
transfer tests are like other tests of the effects of prior experience, even though the effect is not 
one of producing a specific response from the past, but instead a general tendency. Responses on 
near-transfer tasks, like memory tasks, can reveal effects of proactive facilitation or interference 
(Postman, 1962). Next, I describe experiments that used process-dissociation procedures (e.g., 
12 
 
Jacoby, Debner, & Hay, 2001) to investigate the possible automatic and controlled bases of 
proactive interference established by CBM. Automaticity issues are frequently raised in research 
documenting biases related to emotional disorders, and they are at least as pertinent to their 
modification.  Do training procedures truly push around habits—as is implied by typical 
descriptions of CBM effects—or do these effects occur by impairing recollective use of training-
incongruent outcomes? Both possibilities have their clinically relevant counterparts. 
The procedure used in the first two experiments (Hertel, Vasquez, Benbow, & Hughes, 
2011) consisted of three main phases. Phase-1 training trials presented approximately 100 
scenarios describing everyday situations with the possibility but not the certainty of negative 
outcomes.  Each one was missing a final word that, upon completion, would resolve the 
ambiguity regarding negativity. Participants imagined themselves in the scenario and were 
instructed to have a completion word in mind before pressing the spacebar to reveal a word 
fragment. They were instructed to complete the fragment as quickly as possible.  Here is an 
example:  
You are flying to Florida with your family for a holiday in the sun. You notice a 
man sitting alone in the row behind you, opening a package. As the paper is 
removed you see something that looks like a:  
Depending upon the training condition (benign or negative), the fragment for this example was 
either bo-k or bo-b (to be completed as book or bomb). Fragments used to resolve ambiguity in 
the large majority of scenarios in these experiments were consistently benign or negative (or they 
resolved nonambiguous and nonthreatening scenarios in a control condition).  This training 
phase duplicated the materials and procedures of many other CBM experiments. The last block, 
however, departed from the typical paradigm in containing 6-8 resolutions of each type 
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(appropriately counterbalanced). We thought of this block as Phase 2 and set it apart from the 
main training phase through instructions to pay careful attention, because questions would later 
occur. More importantly, these scenarios were unique in theme, and each one had a counterpart 
in the transfer test to come in Phase 3. For example, the babysitting theme was represented by 
the following scenarios:   
[Training]:  You have agreed to baby-sit while your neighbor goes out for the 
evening. You have put their daughter to bed but she takes some time to 
settle down. An hour later you go in to check on her and find she is no longer:  
cr-ing or c-nsc-ous [crying or conscious] 
[Test]:  A neighbor asks you to look after her little girl while she visits a friend in 
the hospital. The five year old cries when her mother leaves but then seems happy 
to play alone in your garden. After ten minutes you go out and she is:  
The task on these test trials in Phase 3 was a choice between two completions; in the preceding 
example the alternatives were fine and gone. These choices in the two experiments by Hertel et 
al. (2011) were made according to inclusion and exclusion instructions from process-dissociation 
procedures (Jacoby, 1991). 
On some test trials (inclusion) participants were instructed to respond in the same way as 
they had responded to the training counterpart within the theme, and on others (exclusion) they 
were instructed to remember the resolution of the training counterpart and to respond differently.  
Instructions were given by color coding in Experiment 1 and by the single words same/different 
in Experiment 2. Accurate responding on inclusion trials and inaccurate responding on exclusion 
trials were used to obtain estimates of habit and controlled recollection (Jacoby, 1991). The main 
outcome of both experiments—one performed with nonanxious and the other with anxious 
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students—occurred as a result of benign training; repeated experience in reaching benign 
resolutions of potentially threatening situations proactively interfered with the recollection of the 
more recent negative resolutions. If benign training is considered to be allegorical to the 
experience of nonanxious people, the moral of this story is something like:  Nonanxious people 
are unaffected by occasional threatening experiences because they have trouble deliberately 
bring them to mind. This is an understandable but odd outcome, because a person’s typical 
phenomenology is not one of trying to remember past similar outcomes in order to respond 
differently (although it is the case that exclusion instructions seem to capture what therapists 
might ask their anxious clients to do). Moreover, we found no effects of training on estimates of 
habit—an outcome that belied common assumptions about the underlying mechanisms of CBM. 
In retrospect, the effects on estimates of controlled recollection and not on estimates of habit 
might have occurred precisely because our exclusion instructions emphasized the controlled 
opposition to habit. 
In a subsequent experiment (Hertel, Holmes, & Benbow, 2013), we took a different 
approach to arriving at estimates of habit and control. The general procedure was much the same 
as in the prior experiments, but the test phase differed. This time we instructed participants to 
respond as they had to a situationally similar scenario on all test trials, and we used congruence 
and incongruence between the Phase-1training condition and the nature of the resolutions in the 
final training block (Phase 2) as our method for expressing the equations used for estimates (see 
Jacoby et al., 2001). For example, benignly trained participants would correctly choose a benign 
resolution at test to the extent that they recollected the benign completion of the analog in the 
final block or, in the absence of recollection, to the extent that a benign habit had been trained. 
These same participants should incorrectly choose a benign resolution at test to the extent of 
15 
 
their “rose colored” habit (possibly established in Phase 1) in the absence of recollection of the 
actual negative resolution. (If they had recollected the negative resolution, they would choose it 
at test.) The equations corresponding to these two assumptions permit estimates of habit and 
control. We believed that this method would reveal training effects on estimates of habit because 
it avoids the use of exclusion instructions with their heavy emphasis on cognitive control.1  
Figure 2 shows the mean estimates of habit and controlled recollection that contributed to 
responding on test trials in this new experiment. Estimates of control were much lower than in 
the previous experiments, although they were significantly above zero in the training conditions, 
and they did not differ according to training. Instead, estimates of habit in responding with 
benign choices were higher in the benign training condition than in the other two conditions. 
Benign training therefore proactively facilitated the habitual basis of benign choices on the 
transfer test, and because choices of negative resolutions were reciprocal to benign choices (and 
always are in the real world) benign training caused proactive interference with the habit of 
choosing threatening outcomes.  Figure 2 also presents the mean proportion of responses on test 
trials where participants were forced to guess about how to respond on the transfer test (because 
situationally similar scenarios were missing from training). These trials were therefore typical of 
CBM transfer trials. The correspondence of habit estimates to guessing proportions bolstered our 
conclusions about the habitual basis of training in typical CBM experiments. Taken together, 
these three experiments indicated that benign training can operate on habit or controlled use of 
prior experience, depending upon whether control is emphasized by the transfer task. In both 
cases, benign training proactively interferes with a negative bias.  
                                                          
1
 We also assumed that procedures with exclusion instructions also place a heavy emphasis on 
control during inclusion trials, when exclusion and inclusion trials are randomized (see Jacoby, 
Shimizu, Velanova, & Rhodes, 2005). 
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These outcomes constitute good news for clinical applications. But they are merely the 
first steps to a fuller understanding that could be achieved by developing more process-analytic 
procedures in examining the development and maintenance of biases and their habitual bases—
and the first steps in constructing new methods for modification. The experiments using process-
dissociation procedures necessarily assumed that habit and control operate independently in 
transfer situations (see Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012). Surely there are other assumptions about how 
processes combine to affect performance in clinically relevant cognitive tasks and other ways to 
oppose and therefore isolate the processes involved.  One might surmise, however, that issues of 
habit and control will always be important, due to the very real fact that cognitive features of 
emotionally disorders are habitually maladaptive and therefore tempt clients and therapists to 
find methods to control them.  
More generally, cognitive bias modification continues to be developed as a possible 
treatment plan for individuals diagnosed with emotional disorders. Clinical researchers involved 
in this development do not seem to believe that any one instantiation of CBM will ever stand 
alone. Instead, CBM research illustrates ways in which empirically based treatments—such as 
components of cognitive behavioral therapy—can become better informed by basic research in 
cognitive or behavioral psychology, not merely because there is evidence of efficacy for the 
treatment but because they emerge from a more fundamental understanding of the processes 
involved in establishing and maintaining the disorders in the first place. CBM pushes around 
those processes.  
17 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean estimates of controlled recollection in fragment completion, following a period 
during which participants simply waited, ruminated, or were distracted (Hertel, 1998).  
 
Figure 2. Mean estimates of control and habit to respond with the benign choice on transfer 
analogs and mean proportion of benign guesses on new transfer scenarios (Hertel, Holmes, & 
Benbow, 2013). Mean estimates of control in responding with negative choices are the same as 
those depicted; mean estimates of habit in responding with negative choices and mean proportion 
of guesses are reciprocal to those depicted. 
 
